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SECURITIES-SECTION 16(b)-A BENEFICIAL OWNER MAY REDUCE
HOLDINGS TO LESS THAN 10% OUTSTANDING COMMON STOCK AND
SUBSEQUENTLY DISPOSE OF REMAINING STOCK IN A SECOND SALE WITH-
IN SIX MONTHS OF PURCHASE WITHOUT BEING LIABLE FOR PROFITS
MADE FROM THE SECOND SALE-Reliance Electric Co. v. Emerson
Electric Co., 92 S. Ct. 596 (1972).
Pursuant to a plan designed to acquire control of Dodge Manufactur-
ing Company, Emerson Electric Company purchased 13.2% of Dodge
common stock. The attempted corporate takeover was frustrated, how-
ever, when the shareholders of Dodge approved a merger with Reliance
Electric Company. Recognizing that (1) a forced exchange of Dodge
stock for shares in the merged corporation was imminent, (2) when
the exchange occurred any shareholder who had acquired at least a
10% ownership of outstanding stock within six months of the exchange
might be an "insider trader" under section 16(b) of the Securities Ex-
change Act of 1934,1 and (3) an "insider trader" would be forced to
disgorge all profits it made as a result of the exchange, Emerson sold
to a brokerage house enough shares to reduce its holdings below 10%.
Emerson, feeling immunized now from the 10% provision of section
16(b), sold its remaining 9.96% of outstanding common stock to
Dodge within three months of Emerson's original purchase of the stock.
1. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 16(b), 48 Stat. 896 (1934), as amended,
15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (1970) [hereinafter referred to as section 16(b)]. Section 16(b)
provides:
For the purpose of preventing the unfair use of information which may have
been obtained by such beneficial owner, director, or officer by reason of his re-
lationship to the issuer, any profit realized by him from any purchase and sale,
or any sale and purchase, of any equity security of such issuer (other than an
exempted security) within any period of less than six months, unless such se-
curity was acquired in good faith in connection with a debt previously con-
tracted, shall inure to and be recoverable by the issuer, irrespective of any in-
tention on the part of such beneficial owner, director, or officer in entering into
such transaction of holding the security purchased or of not repurchasing the
security sold for a period exceeding six months. Suit to recover such profit
may be instituted at law or in equity in any court of competent jurisdiction by
the issuer, or by the owner of any security of the issuer in the name and in
behalf of the issuer if the issuer shall fail or refuse to bring such suit within
sixty days after request or shall fail diligently to prosecute the same thereafter;
but no such suit shall be brought more than two years after the date such profit
was realized. This subsection shall not be construed to cover any transaction
where such beneficial owner was not such both at the time of the purchase and
sale, or the sale and purchase, of the security involved, or any transaction or
transactions which the Commission by rules and regulations may exempt as not
comprehended within the purpose of this subsection. (emphasis added).
A beneficial owner is defined as one who owns "more than 10 per centum of any
class of any equity security (other than an exempted security) which is registered pur-
suant to section 12 of this title. . . ." Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 16(a), 15
U.S.C. § 78p(a) (1970).
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Following a demand by Reliance that Emerson disgorge the profits
from both sales, Emerson sought a declaration in federal court of its
liability under section 16(b). The district court held Emerson liable
for all profits,' but the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit re-
versed as to liability for profits flowing from the second sale.' The
Supreme Court granted certiorari and affirmed in a 4-3 decision. Al-
though Emerson split its sale of Dodge stock with the intent of avoid-
ing most of its potential section 16(b) liability, the provisions of the
section must be literally read and, since the statute encompasses only
those sales made within six months of purchase and sale by a 10%
holder who is such at the time of both purchase and sale, liability for
the second sale is precluded.4
Justice Stewart, who wrote the Court's opinion, posed the question
in Reliance as whether the step transaction used by Emerson was per-
mitted by the statute. The intention of Emerson to avoid liability was
deemed not to be determinative in imposing liability under section
16(b). 5 Cognizant that the statute requires the seller to be a 10%
owner at "both the time of the purchase and sale . . . of the security
involved," the Court chose to restrict the meaning of that phrase to ob-
2. Emerson Electric Co. v. Reliance Electric Co., 306 F. Supp. 588 (E.D. Mo.
1969).
3. Emerson Electric Co. v. Reliance Electric Co., 434 F.2d 918 (8th Cir. 1970).
4. Reliance Electric Co. v. Emerson Electric Co., 92 S. Ct. 596, 599, 601 (1972).
The question of liability for profits derived from the first sale of 3.24% of the out-
standing common stock was not adjudicated by the Supreme Court. The lower courts
found liability and it seems clear that the Supreme Court would have decided
similarly.
The trial court had clearly found that the sales were linked to a single plan of
disposition and were structured and effectuated to avoid section 16(b) liability. 306
F. Supp. 588, 592 (E.D. Mo. 1969). Nevertheless, this finding of fact was deemed
"irrelevant" by the eighth circuit. 434 F.2d 918, 926 (8th Cir. 1970).
5. 92 S. CL at 599. If the Court had focused upon intent, liability certainly
could have attached. See note 4 supra. However, by emphasizing the "method" em-
ployed to accomplish the transaction, the Court seems to have laid bare a discernible
loophole in the statute's ambit of prohibition. It has been noted that any intelligent
manipulater may structure his affairs to avoid section 16(b) liability:
[Wihile proof that there was no misuse of inside information does not avoid
liability under Section 16(b), neither does proof of actual misuse of inside in-
formation establish liability, if the insider has manipulated not only the stock
but also his transaction so that they fall outside the wholly arbitrary rules of that
section. R. JENN NGS & H. MARsH, SEcURrrms REGULATION 1031 (2d ed. 1968).
6. Section 16(b), note 1 supra. The phrase has been construed to encompass the
original purchase transaction that elevated the defendant to beneficial owner status.
In Stella v. Graham-Page Motors Corp., 232 F.2d 299 (2d Cir. 1956), the court held
that "at the time of the purchase and sale . . ." was to be interpreted to require in-
quiry into ownership "immediately after" purchase and "immediately prior" to sale
rather than "simultaneously with." As one commentator noted, to construe the section
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jective standards. 7 Rejecting the district court's treatment of "time of
sale" as including "'the entire period during which a series of related
transactions takes place pursuant to a plan which a 10% beneficial
owner disposes of his stock holding,' "8 the Court refused to view the
10% requirement any more subjectively than the six month requirement.
Since a plan to sell conceived within six months of the purchase would
not fall within the ambit of section 16(b), neither would a sale by a
person holding less than 10%.' Reliance thus marks a return to an ob-
jective approach toward section 16(b) which would preserve the mech-
anistic quality of that statute.10 Any change in interpretation, the
in any other manner would render section 16(b) ineffective since its provisions could
be avoided by a single sale. Seligman, Problems Under the Securities Exchange Act,
21 VA. L. Rlv. 1, 19-20 (1934); see II L. Loss, SECUMrEs REGULATION 1060
(2d ed. 1961); contra, Arkansas Louisiana Gas Co. v. W.R. Stephens Investment Co.,
141 F. Supp. 841, 847 (W.D. Ark. 1956).
7. 92 S. Ct. at 599: "Mhe only method Congress deemed effective to curb the evils
of insider trading was a flat rule. . ....
8. 92 S. Ct. at 598, quoting 306 F. Supp. 588, 592.
9. 92 S. Ct. at 600. The Court was of the opinion that Congress had concluded
that a stockholder with a "long-term", i.e. six month, investment of 10% or more of
the outstanding shares is generally more likely to have access to inside information
than an investor moving in and out of the 10% category during the six month period.
Id. The obvious implication is that a multitude of transactions structured similar to
Emerson's within the six month period would only hold the stockholder liable for the
reduction sales. See note 4 supra. Consequently, an insider could purchase 11%,
sell 1.1%, repurchase and resell (only being held accountable for the 1.1% and subse-
quent reduction transactions), and yet enjoy a position from his periodic 10% owner-
ship which affords him easy access to inside information. Nevertheless, in the
Court's analysis, he is less likely to have access to inside information than is a 10%
continual owner. The Court stated that commentators have actually recommended
this reduction procedure. Id. at 599 & n.3, citing 11 L. Loss, SECURITiES REGULATION
1060 (2d ed. 1961); Seligman, supra note 6, at 20. A careful reading of these
authorities, however, reveals that they by no means have recommended or endorsed
the two-step transaction but merely have considered it a possible means of section
16(b) avoidance. See V Loss at 3023 (Supp. 1969).
10. The objective approach consists of a literal interpretation and application of the
statute, thus imposing strict liability. The often quoted case of Smolowe v. Delendo
Corp., 136 F.2d 231 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 320 U.S. 751 (1943), represents the earli-
est adoption of this method of imposing section 16(b) liability.
It is apparent too, from the language of § 16(b) itself, as well as from the
Congressional hearings, that the only remedy which its framers deemed effective
for this reform was the imposition of a liability based upon an objective measure
of proof. . . . Id. at 235.
A subjective standard of proof, requiring a showing of an actual unfair use of
-inside information, would render senseless the provisions of the legislation limit-
ing the liability period to six months, making an intention to profit during that
period immaterial, and exempting transactions wherein there is a bona fide ac-
quisition of stock in connection with a previously contracted debt. Id. at 236.
The myriad variations of complicated transactions that ultimately became subject to
section 16(b) scrutiny gradually rendered this objective approach impractical and un-
workable. See note 32 infra. Although the earlier cases adopted the Smolowe
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Court felt, must come by legislative amendment;"' the two-step sale was
certainly not "the kind of evil which Congress sought to correct through
16(b).' 2
Justice Douglas, who authored the dissenting opinion, characterized
the majority holding as
a mutilation of the Act, contrary to its broad remedial purpose,
inconsistent with the flexibility required in the interpretation of se-
curities legislation and not required by the language of the statute
itself.'3
Adopting a pragmatic approach, Justice Douglas determined that re-
gardless of the semantics involved in framing the issue, the dispute
must be resolved in light of the clear legislative purpose to curb short
approach, the recent decisions seem to have "shifted . . .to a much more subjective
approach . . .an approach less automatic and mechanistic and more fact-oriented and
pragmatic." Lowenfels, Section 16(b): A New Trend Regulating Insider Trading, 54
CORNELL L. REV. 45, 45-46 (1968) (emphasis added) [hereinafter cited as Lowenfels].
This pragmatic or subjective approach rejects a black letter application of the statute
and, in favor of greater flexibility and consistency with legislative purpose, focuses
analysis upon the purpose of section 16(b), expressed in the first two lines of that
statute. "The threshold issue ...is whether the [transaction] ... len[ds] itself to
the type of speculative abuse which section 16(b) was designed to prevent." Newmark
v. RKO General, Inc., 425 F.2d 348, 353 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 854 (1970).
11. 92 S. Ct. at 600.
12. Id. The majority climaxed its opinion by referring to an inconsistency between
various SEC rules and the position taken by the SEC in the instant case that the sole
purpose of the 10% requirement at the time of both purchase and sale was to exclude
from the statute's coverage those persons who became 10% shareholders involuntarily.
Id. at 600-01. Rule 16(a)-10 exempts from section 16(b) any transactions which
need not be reported under section 16(a). Rule 16a-10, 17 C.F.R. § 240.16(a)-16
(1971). Additionally, Release No. 6487 has interpreted section 16(a) to exempt a
stockholder from the requirement of reporting holdings that are less than 10% at any
time during the month. Form 4, SEC Release No. 6487 (Mar. 9, 1961). As
such, since Emerson would not be required under section 16(a) to report his second
sale, there would be no section 16(b) liability under the foregoing rules. However, as
the dissent points up, "the promulgation of rules is not a matter solely within the
expertise of the SEC and beyond the scope of judicial review." 90 S. Ct. at 608,
quoting Feder v. Martin Marietta Corp., 406 F.2d 260, 268 (2d Cir. 1969), cert.
denied, 396 U.S. 808 (1970). The Feder court, in holding an ex-director liable under
section 16(b), was not inhibited by a SEC reporting requirement in light of the pro-
phylactic purpose of section 16(b), where the exercise of the SEC rule-making
power was "arbitrarily inadequate." The Reliance Court could also have invali-
dated the instant exemption to provide "a logical extension of 16(b) coverage ...in
line with the congressional aims, and ... afford[ing] greater assurance that the law-
makers intent will be effectuated." Id. at 269. Nevertheless, the majority felt that
they could not adopt a construction which "not only strains, but flatly contradicts the
words of the statute."
13. 90 S. Ct. at 602.
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swing speculation by insiders.' 4 To ensure the maximum prophylactic
effect the statute was designed to provide, the Justice urged that a re-
buttable presumption be engrafted onto section 16(b) so "that any
such series of dispositive transactions will be deemed to be a part of a
single plan disposition, and will be treated as a single 'sale' for the
purposes of 16(b)."'15 The presumption would place the burden of
proof on the defendant and would accordingly broaden the remedial
effect of the statute in a manner consistent with the statutory scheme.
Intent would become a litigable issue and the defendant would be re-
quired to come forward with the affirmative defense that the transac-
tions did not afford him "an opportunity for speculative abuse of his
position as an insider. . . ."'1 This approach would require an ad hoc
factual inquiry as to insider trader status. Although the section's ob-
jectivism would be sacrificed in favor of remedial expansion, the re-
buttable presumption would remove the insulation provided by its
mechanistic interpretation.' 7  Justice Douglas further noted that while
the six month rule is grounded upon the congressional determination
that normal market fluctuation beyond this time period is sufficient to
deter inside trading, the 10% rule is based on the assumption that in-
side information will be available to one who owns a 10% beneficial in-
terest. 8 Therefore, any sale within that period of time by a 10% owner
14. Id. at 605. The basic concern of Congress in enacting 16(b) was to protect
the outsider who is not on an equal footing with inside beneficial holders. Id. at
nn. 2 & 3, citing Testimony of Thomas Corcoran, Hearings on H.R. 7862 & H.R.
8720 before the House Committee on Interstate & Foreign Commerce, 73d Cong.,
2d Sess. 85 (1934); S. REP. No. 792, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 9 (1934). The dissent
concluded that 16(b) was intended to inhibit if not prevent the "predatory opera-
tions" revealed by Congress by "removing all possibility of profit from those short-swing
insider trades occurring within the statutory period of six months." 90 S. Ct. at 603
(footnote omitted).
15. 90 S. Ct. at 607. The dissent noted that several of the provisions of the 1933
Act already provide presumptions based on the determination that short term sales
activity generally reflects an intent to embark on public distribution without registra-
tion. Id. at 607 n.12.
16. Id. at 608 (emphasis added).
17. The dissent correctly recognized that "[w]hatever 'mechanical quality' the stat-
ute possesses, it was intended to ease the plaintiff's burden, not to insulate the in-
sider's profits." 92 S. Ct. at 606-07.. Concern for the plaintiff's burden is most notice-
able in the testimony of one of the draftsmen of the Act (see note 14 supra), and was
in fact a primary motivating force in the original rejection of a "subjective standard
of proof, requiring a showing of an actual unfair use of inside information. .. "
Smolowe v. Delendo Corp., 136 F.2d 231, 236 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 320 U.S. 751
(1943).
18. 92 S. Ct. at 609, citing Blau v. Max Factor, 342 F.2d 304, 308 (9th Cir.), cert.
denied, 382 U.S. 892 (1965) and Newmark v. RKO General, 425 F.2d 348 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 400 U.S. 854 (1970).
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carries a "presumption of a taint even if a prior transaction. . has
reduced. . ownership to 10% or below." 19
The Court in Reliance exhibited a reluctance to extend statutory
liability to any but the most literal violations of section 16(b). A con-
venient method of circumlocuting the limitation which the Court has
placed on section 16(b) liability exists, however. Instead of concen-
trating upon whether there is a 10% beneficial ownership of stock at
the time of a second sale, emphasis could be given to the phrase "at
the time of sale." This perspective was utilized by the dissent to ex-
pand the concept of "sale" to encompass both of Emerson's transac-
tions.
"Whatever the terms 'purchase' and 'sale' may mean in other contexts,
they should be construed in a manner which will effectuate the purposes
of the specific section of the [Exchange] Act in which they are used."
'20
The statute is thereby given its broadest possible interpretation.
In dealing with "sale" lower courts have not shunned from making
a factual inquiry into. "opportunity for the abuse of inside information"
as did the Court's majority in Reliance.21 The second circuit has stated
that the judicial tendency "has been to interpret section 16(b) in ways
that are most consistent with the legislative purpose, even departing
where necessary from the literal statutory language.""t Nevertheless,
19. Id.
20. Id. at 604, quoting Bershad v. McDonough, 428 F.2d 693, 697 (7th Cir. 1970),
cert. denied, 400 U.S. 992 (1971).
21. Compare Bershad v. McDonough, 428 F.2d 693 (7th Cir. 1970), cert. denied,
400 U.S. 992 (1971) (holding a sale within six months although an option was not
formally exercised) with Abrams v. Occidental Petroleum Corp., 450 F.2d 157
(5th Cir. 1971), cert. granted, sub. nom. Kern County Land Co. v. Occidental
Petroleum Corp., 92 S. Ct. 1498 (1972) (holding profits by an exchange transaction
and option agreement not recoverable). Additionally, see, e.g., Park & Tilford v.
Schulte, Inc., 160 F.2d 984 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 332 U.S. 761 (1947), affirming
Kogan v. Schulte, 61 F. Supp. 604 (S.D.N.Y. 1945) (conversion of preferred stock as
a purchase); Heli-Corp. v. Webster, 352 F.2d 156 (3d Cir. 1965) (conversion of pre-
ferred stock as a sale). Contra, Blau v. Lamb, 363 F.2d 507 (2d Cir. 1966), cert.
denied, 385 U.S. 1002 (1967); Ferraiola v. Newman, 259 F.2d 342 (6th Cir. 1958),
cert. denied, 359 U.S. 927 (1959) (conversion of preferred stock held not to be a
purchase); Chemical Fund Inc. v. Xerox Corp., 377 F.2d 107 (2d Cir. 1967); Petteys
v. Butler, 367 F.2d 528 (8th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1006 (1967); Leyman
v. Livingston, 276 F. Supp. 104 (D. Del. 1967) (conversion of debentures into stock
held not to be a purchase or sale).
22. Feder v. Martin Marrietta Corp., 406 F.2d 260, 262 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied,
296 U.S. 808 (1970). This approach may have been utilized to find Emerson liable
without shifting the focus from "10%" to "sale." See Colby v. Klune, 178 F.2d 872
(2d Cir. 1949), wherein the court engaged in a factual inquiry as to the "officer-
director" status of the defendant by formulating the definition of an officer as "[a]
1972]
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Reliance evidences an unwillingness to apply a subjective test to the
Act as a whole.
The majority opinion recognized that "where alternate constructions
of the terms of 16(b) are possible, those terms are to be given the
construction that best serves the congressional purpose of curbing short
swing speculation by corporate insiders."23  Yet the Court could envi-
sion no alternate construction of the section. Rather, it narrowly
focused upon an alternative provision of the section-the 10% require-
ment. Moreover, by failing to distinguish the rationale for the six
month rule from that of the 10% requirement, the Court enshrined pres-
ervation of the "objective measure of proof" as being more funda-
mental to statutory design than the maintenance of the "wholesome
purpose" of the Act.24 It was left for the dissent to justifiably observe
that
[t]here is no rule so "objective" (automatic would be a better word) that
does not require mental effort in applying it on the part of the person or
persons entrusted by law with its application.25
The majority opinion, by underscoring the 10% requirement in favor
of both the six month limitation and the concept of sale, undertook
such a mental effort. This rigid construction of section 16(b) cer-
tainly presents an undue limitation to its enforcement. On the other
hand, the rebuttable presumption proffered by the dissent 20 expands
too greatly the breadth of the statute. Prior history has confirmed that
section 16(b) can apply in an exceedingly harsh manner;27 the dis-
corporate employee performing important executive duties of such a character that
he would be likely, in discharging these duties, to obtain confidential information
about the company's affairs that would aid him if he engaged in personal market
transactions." Id. at 873.
However, the differing treatment afforded the beneficial owner in Reliance may be
explained in part from the distinction between "officer-director" and "beneficial
owner." A defendant officer-director need only to have attained that status at the
time of either purchase or sale, while "beneficial owner" need be such both at the time
of purchase and sale. See Adler v. Klawans, 267 F.2d 840, 845-47 (2d Cir. 1959)
(discussing the distinction between the two categories).
23. Id. at 600.
24. "[Wlhatever the rationale of the provision, [that a beneficial owner must own
10% at the time of both the purchase and sale] it cannot be disregarded simply on
the grounds that it may be inconsistent with our assessment of the 'wholesome purpose'
of the Act." Id.
25. Id. at 605, quoting Blau v. Lamb, 363 F.2d 507, 520 (2d Cir. 1966), cert.
denied, 385 U.S. 1002 (1967) (emphasis added).
26. See text accompanying notes 14-16 supra.
27. See, e.g., Booth v. Varian Associates, 224 F. Supp. 225 (C.D. Mass. 1963),
aff'd, 334 F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 961 (1965) (though an
agreement fully committed the parties thereto to an eventual exchange, the date of
[Vol. 5
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sent's presumption would merely aggravate this discriminatory facet of
the statute.
28
Commentators have suggested that early section 16(b) decisions
were motivated by the desire to impose broad liability in the absence
of other available redress for insider abuse.2 9  However, several au-
thors contend that the burgeoning and pervasive extensions of Rule
10b-5 now render an expansive interpretation of section 16(b) un-
necessary. 0 This ratiocination, although questionably grounded,31 may
underlie the Court's revival of an objective standard which may easily
be applied even to highly intricate transactions.32
A middle ground can be suggested to reconcile the opinions of the
Reliance majority and dissent with both the literal language and statu-
tory purpose of section 16(b). A judicial inquiry, similar to that
employed in tax cases, into the nature of the two-step transaction
would constitute a realistic accommodation of the two positions.33 In
purchase, for purposes of 16(b), was held to be date of exchange, and defendants
were held liable for profits from sale within six months of purchase).
28. To alleviate the harsh result of the presumption, the dissent suggested that a
showing of changed circumstances similar to that once allowed for a section 4(2) pri-
vate offering could be offered in rebuttal. 92 S. Ct. at 608 n.13. However, it may
be questioned whether the strictly limited and highly indefinitive criteria of changed
circumstances underlying investment intent in private placements would in fact assuage
the encompassing presumption of the dissent.
29. E.g., Munter, Section 16(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934: An Alter-
native to Burning Down the Barn in Order to Kill the Rats, 52 Coi.uNu, L. REV. 69,
74-77 (1966).
30. E.g., Bateman, The Pragmatic Interpretation of Section 16(b) and The Need for
Clarification, 45 ST. JoHN L. Rav. 772, 785-86, 797 (1971); Lowenfels, supra note 10,
at 63.
31. Actions brought under lOb-5 remain limited by the purchaser-seller require-
ment of Birnbaum v. Newport Steel Corp., 193 F.2d 461 (2d Cir. 1952), cert. denied,
343 U.S. 956 (1952); Edelman v. Decker, 337 F. Supp. 582 (E.D. Pa. 1972); Manor
Drug Stores v. Blue Chip Stamps 339 F. Supp. 35 (C.D. Cal. 1971). But cf.
Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 404 U.S. 6 (1971); Tully v. Mott
Supermarkets, Inc., 337 F. Supp. 834 (D.N.J. 1972); Lowenfels, The Demise of the
Birnbaum Doctrine: A New Era for Rule lOb-5, 54 VA. L. REv. 268 (1968).
Further, under section 10(b)(5), there must be injury to the plaintiff and some causal
connection must exist between the alleged violation and the injury. Lewis v. Bogin,
337 F. Supp. 331, 335-38 (S.D.N.Y. 1972).
32. See, e.g., Blau v. Lamb, 363 F.2d 507 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1002
(1966), wherein the court recognize that "this section may be applied not only to
routine cash purchases and sales of equity securities but also . . . to acquisitions . . .
conversions, options, stock warrants, reclassifications and the like." Id. at 516.
33. The solution posed, however, would by no means eliminate all problems. As
one writer commenting on the concept of "sham transaction" has stated:
In spite of all that has been written about the by purpose doctrine, sham trans-
actions, net effect, and the role of the court in looking through the form to find
substance, no authoritative, explicit rationale for judicial intervention to frus-
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handling federal income tax litigation, the courts have been guided by
the purpose of the transaction rather than its mechanics. The violence
done to the literal interpretation of a statute is generally considered
less significant than promotion of congressional design.3 4 The following
quotation is directly analogous:
The incidence of taxation depends upon the substance of a trans-
action. The tax consequences which arise from ... a sale ...are
not finally to be determined solely by the means employed to transfer
legal title. Rather the transaction must be viewed as a whole, and
each step, from the commencement of negotiation to the consum-
mation of sale is relevant . .. To permit the true nature of a trans-
action to be disguised by mere formalisms . . .would seriously im-
pair the effective administration of the tax policies of congress.A5
It is certainly no more inconsistent with the wording of section
16(b) to construe the six month trading requirement to include a two-
step sales transaction than it is to define "at the time of the purchase
and sale . . ." as requiring an inquiry into ownership "immediately
after" purchase and "immediately prior" to sale.30 A different con-
struction in either instance substantially renders section 16(b) ineffec-
tive and robs the statute of its vitality.
The court of appeals in Reliance limited its holding to two sales
"not legally tied to each other and made at different times to differ-
ent buyers. . . ."37 Whether the Supreme Court decision is so lim-
ited is not clear. While the Court took notice of the lower court's
statement, it did not explicitly adhere to it. In fact, the Court implied
that two sales to the same buyer would not violate the statute.38
Nevertheless, where a short interval of time occurs between the first
and second sales and where the sales are "legally tied to each other"
(e.g., through an option), it is suggested that the "sales" be inter-
preted as one sale within six months by a beneficial owner. Intent
trate plans for tax avoidance has ever been given. Fuller, Business Purpose,
Sham Transactions and the Relation of Private Law to the Law of Taxation,
37 TtI.. L. REv. 355, 389 (1962-63).
34. See, e.g., Pinellas Ice & Cold Storage Co. v. Commissioner, 287 U.S. 462 (1932)
and Cortland Specialty Co. v. Commissioner, 60 F.2d 937 (2d Cir. 1932) (holding
that the transaction constituted a sale rather than a merger or consolidation although
it literally fell within the language of the statute providing such an exemption).
35. Commissioner v. Court Holding Co., 324 U.S. 331, 334 (1945) (the Court
attributed the sale to the corporation rather than to the shareholders where property
was disguised as a liquid dividend in the two-step transaction).
36. See note 6 supra.
37. 434 F.2d at 926.
38. 91 S. Ct. at 599 n.3, quoting 2 L. Loss, SEcunrnEs REoULATION 1060 (2d
ed. 1961).
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